TX068 極超音速兵器開発状況について

 下記は、Congressional Research Serviceが,先日(2022年3月17日)発表した、Hypersonic Weapons:Background and Issues for Congressです。米国会議が、“変化し続ける防衛環境に対応する為に、どんな対応を迫られているか”を理解し、こうした開発に参加し始めた日本国の国会議員、防衛省、外務省のリーダーが持っておくべき認識とは何か、そんなことを意識してのテキサスからの情報提供です。

1.Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for US Congress

The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons— maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.

Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles— potentially armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S. hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.

The Pentagon’s FY2022 budget request for hypersonic research is $3.8 billion—up from $3.2 billion in the FY2021 request. The Missile Defense Agency additionally requested $247.9 million for hypersonic defense. At present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not have approved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as Principal Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets.

As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control. Potential questions include the following:

  • What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most costeffective means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine and concepts?
  • Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and technologically feasible?
  • How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
  • Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities?

下記がHypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress (updated March 17, 2022) レポートのコンテンツです。左記、https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21446946/hypersonic-weapons-background-and-issues-for-congress-march-17-2022.pdf にアクセスして、詳細ご覧ください。

Contents Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1 Background ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2 United States…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4 Programs…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4 Infrastructure……………………………………………………………………………………………………….11 Russia …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 12 Programs…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 Infrastructure……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 China ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 Programs…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 Infrastructure……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17 Issues for Congress………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 19 Mission Requirements………………………………………………………………………………………………. 20 Funding and Management Considerations…………………………………………………………………… 21 Strategic Stability…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 22 Arms Control…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23 Figures Figure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs. Hypersonic Glide Vehicles………… 3 Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard…………………………………………………………………………….. 14 Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype………………………………………………….. 18 Tables Table 1. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons RDT&E Funding………………………………………… 9 Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities…………………………………………………………… 25 Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges…………………………………………………………………………………… 26 Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets……………………………………………………………………………………….. 26 Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities…………………………………………………………………… 27 Table A-5. Department of Energy Research-Related Facilities…………………………………………….. 27 Table A-6. Industry/Academic Research-Related Facilities…………………………………………………. 27 Appendixes Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing Infrastructure …………………………………………………………….. 25 Contacts Author Information………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 28

2.Report to Congress on Hypersonic Weapons

by Staff Writers
Washington DC (SPX) Mar 19, 2022

The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons-maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5-as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight.

As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.

Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles-potentially armed with nuclear warheads.

Most U.S. hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.

The Pentagon’s FY2022 budget request for hypersonic research is $3.8 billion-up from $3.2 billion in the FY2021 request. The Missile Defense Agency additionally requested $247.9 million for hypersonic defense. At present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not have approved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans.

Indeed, as Principal Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets.

As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control. Potential questions include the following:

What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine and concepts?

Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and technologically feasible?

How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?

Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities?

3.Eyeing China, Japan breaks with past for strong Ukraine response
by AFP Staff Writers

Tokyo (AFP) March 21, 2022

Japan has broken with years of precedent in its tough response to the Ukraine invasion, and the conflict could reshape Tokyo’s defence strategy as it confronts China’s regional ambitions, analysts say.

When Russia last pushed into Ukraine in 2014, Japan’s response was seen as lukewarm, but this time around it has marched in lockstep with Western allies on unprecedented sanctions and tough rhetoric, even sending non-lethal military aid.

And the crisis is already impacting debates on security spending and capacity in a country whose constitution limits its military to defence.

“Japan has been accused before of paying its way out, in a way, just giving money but not being directly involved in any crisis,” said Valerie Niquet, an Asia expert at France’s Foundation for Strategic Research think tank.

This time, Tokyo is “putting a lot of emphasis on what they are doing… to show that they are not just sitting by and waiting to see how things will evolve”.

And the speed with which Tokyo has moved on measures such as individual sanctions has been “completely remarkable”, said Tobias Harris, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.

“This is much further than I thought we would see the Japanese government go.”

In part, that reflects the extraordinary nature of the conflict, but several other key factors are at play, including the departure of former prime minister Shinzo Abe, who long sought closer ties with Moscow.

Abe, who resigned in 2020, had hoped warmer relations would lead to a breakthrough over disputed islands held by Russia, which Moscow calls the Kurils and Japan calls the Northern Territories.

But with Abe gone and years of deadlock on the dispute, Japan’s government has felt freer to act against Moscow, though fears about energy needs have so far stopped Tokyo from pulling out of joint energy projects with Russia.

– Eye on China –

Looming even larger though is China, with its growing ambitions in the region, including its desire to “reunify” Taiwan and its claims to disputed islands it calls the Diaoyu, known as the Senkaku in Japan.

In the past, Tokyo worried aggressive actions on Russia could push Moscow into Beijing’s arms, said James D.J. Brown, an associate professor of political science at Tokyo’s Temple University.

“Now however, that’s completely flipped around,” he told AFP.

Instead, the view is that “Japan has to be tough on Russia, because otherwise it sets a precedent, and perhaps encourages China to think that they could do the same thing”.

In the immediate term, Japan is expected to completely overhaul its view of Russia in its National Security Strategy due later this year.

“Definitely Russia will be very much described as a threat,” said Niquet.

“In the last one, in 2013, Russia was seen more as, if not an opportunity, certainly not a threat. That will change completely.”

– Nuclear-sharing discussion –

And the Ukraine crisis is likely to strengthen the hand of those calling for more defence spending.

In campaigning last year, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party set a long-term goal of raising the defence budget to more than two percent of GDP, up from its traditional one percent.

That is “now something that they can realistically push towards”, said Brown.

Discussion of obtaining a strike capacity such as attack drones that could carry out first strikes against an enemy has been controversial given the constitutional limits on Japan’s military.

But “the images we’ve seen out of Ukraine are going to be useful for people who want Japan to have a more robust national defence”, Harris said.

“Self-defence is going to look increasingly like a fig leaf, I suspect.”

Even more controversially, Japan’s ruling party is set to debate nuclear deterrence, after suggestions from lawmakers including Abe that the possibility of “nuclear-sharing” be considered.

That is likely to remain a bridge too far, at least for now.

While Japan relies on the US nuclear umbrella, its long-standing policy bars it from producing, possessing or hosting the weapons.

But even a discussion of the issue in a country that suffered the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bomb attacks indicates the far-reaching effects of the Ukraine crisis.

“I think we haven’t seen fully the impact this war will have on Japan’s internal discussions,” Harris said.

Best regards,
Shoichi Sugiyama, Ph.D.

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